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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2385 
___________ 
 
MARTIN BRESLIN, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00261 
(Honorable Susan D. Wigenton) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 7, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 9, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Martin Breslin appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Social Security 
Administration’s final decision denying Breslin supplemental security income. Because 
substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s finding Breslin was not 
disabled under Social Security Act § 1614(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3), we will affirm. 
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I. 
 Breslin was born in 1961, and was 48 years old on the date of the ALJ decision. 
He attended college for two or three years. In the fifteen years before the ALJ decision,1
 On December 25, 2003, Breslin was admitted to Palisades Medical Center for 
alcohol intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest after drinking beer without any meals for 
three weeks. During his hospitalization, Breslin was diagnosed with congestive heart 
failure, among other conditions, and was prescribed various medications. He was 
discharged on February 4, 2004, in good condition. Breslin testified he had not “had a 
drop” of alcohol since his admission to the hospital. 
 
he worked as a film expediter for NBC Universal from 1993 to 1995 and in a warehouse 
of AQL Decorating Service in 1998. Both jobs required lifting as much as 50 pounds. He 
has not worked since 1998. At the hearing before the ALJ, Breslin testified he was fired 
from the NBC and AQL jobs because “I had an alcohol problem.” 
 Dr. Ashraf Faltas conducted a consultative examination of Breslin on March 20, 
2007. Dr. Faltas found atrial fibrillation alternating with atrial flutter (irregular 
heartbeats)2
                                              
1 The Social Security Administration only considers substantial gainful activity 
performed in the previous fifteen years “past relevant work” for purposes of determining 
if a person is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 
 and concluded “This is a 46-year-old male with chronic alcohol consumption 
and was diagnosed with . . . cardiomyopathy anterior chest and cardiac arrhythmia as a 
result of heavy alcohol use. Physical examination is completely unremarkable.” Dr. 
Faltas found no support for Breslin’s claim of poor circulation and noted Breslin 
2 Atrial fibrillation or flutter, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, MEDLINEPLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000184.htm. 
3 
 
“[a]dmits to drinking 1 pint of alcohol and a six pack of beer every day.” On January 30, 
2008, Dr. Faltas conducted a reevaluation of Breslin with the same results except that 
Breslin’s atrial fibrillation also alternated with sinus arrhythmia (a normal variation in 
heartbeats)3
 In the hearing before the ALJ, Breslin testified he had poor circulation in his legs, 
got fatigued easily, and felt lightheaded when he bent over repeatedly. When he sat for 
more than ten minutes, he lost feeling in his legs and he needed to get up, stretch, and 
change positions. Because his legs sometimes jerked and spasmed, his doctor directed 
him not to drive, a direction he had followed since 1990. He had trouble staying 
balanced, so he avoided public transportation and the crowds on it. He could walk six city 
blocks before stopping, stand for up to 20 minutes, and carry up to 35 pounds across a 
room. Sometimes in the mornings, his legs felt heavy and he needed to do knee stretches 
before he could get out of bed. He could climb the seven steps to his mother’s house, 
where he lived. He helped his mother with chores, such as dusting, carrying laundry, and 
food shopping. He had not had his medications changed to treat his conditions. 
 and Breslin stated he had “quit smoking and drinking alcohol since the last 
visit.” 
 The ALJ found Breslin had one severe impairment, chronic heart failure, that was 
not of listing severity. The ALJ found Breslin’s symptoms limited him to light or 
sedentary work, but did not find credible Breslin’s contentions of additional limitations. 
Finding jobs existed that Breslin could perform, the ALJ concluded Breslin was not 
                                              
3 Sinus Arrhythmia, BETTER MEDICINE, http://www.localhealth.com/article/sinus-
arrhythmia. 
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disabled under the Social Security Act and accordingly not entitled to SSI. The ALJ’s 
denial became the agency’s final decision when the Social Security Administration 
Appeals Council denied Breslin’s request for review. Breslin then sued in District Court 
to review the agency’s final decision. The District Court held the agency’s decision was 
supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. Breslin appeals the District Court’s 
decision, contending he had impairments in addition to those the ALJ found, the ALJ was 
incorrect to find his statements about his limitations not credible, and the ALJ did not 
properly assess whether jobs existed that Breslin could perform. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the Agency’s factual findings only to determine 
whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” 
Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). “Our review of legal issues is 
plenary.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). 
To determine if Breslin was entitled to SSI, the ALJ properly followed the Social 
Security Administration’s five-step process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled: 
First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in 
substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the Commissioner considers in the 
second step whether the claimant has a ‘severe impairment’ that significantly 
limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. If the 
claimant suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based on the 
medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in the 
‘listing of impairments,’ 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1999), which result in 
a presumption of disability, or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If 
the impairment does not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, then the 
Commissioner assesses in the fourth step whether, despite the severe impairment, 
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. If the 
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claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether 
there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform. The 
claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four of this test. The 
Commissioner bears the burden of proof for the last step. 
 
Allen, 417 F.3d at 401 n.2 (quoting Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262-63). Breslin does not 
challenge the ALJ’s findings at step one or four. 
At step two, the ALJ found Breslin had one severe impairment: chronic heart 
failure. The ALJ found Breslin’s other heart-related abnormalities – atrial fibrillation, 
atrial flutter, sinus arrhythmia, and “an unidentified abnormality seen on a chest x[-]ray” 
– either did not meet the 12-month duration requirement for severity, under 20 C.F.R. § 
416.909, or were no longer affecting him. The ALJ found Breslin’s “allegations of bad 
circulation in his legs and a myocardial infarction are not supported by the evidence.”4
                                              
4 A myocardial infarction is a heart attack. Heart attack, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF 
MEDICINE, PUBMED HEALTH, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001246/. 
 
Breslin contends, for the first time on appeal, the ALJ was incorrect to find the following 
impairments not severe: “cardiomyopathy, congestive heart failure, easy fatiguability, 
shortness of breath, chronic arrhythmia, vertigo, difficulty sleeping due to poor 
circulation, hypertension[], [and] atrial fibrillation alternating with atrial flutter.” Since 
Breslin did not raise this issue before the District Court, it is waived on appeal. Gass v. 
Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002). The only exception to waiver 
is “when manifest injustice would result from a failure to consider a novel issue.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). This exceptional circumstance is not present here 
because Breslin “offers no explanation for his failure to raise [the issue] in the district 
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court, and we are not aware of any obstacles that prevented him from doing so.” Altman 
v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981).5
At step three, the ALJ found Breslin’s severe impairment did not meet or equal 
listing 4.02, for chronic heart failure, in the listing of impairments. Breslin contends, for 
the first time on appeal, “the ALJ never discussed Listing 4.05 pertaining to Appellant’s 
atrial fibrillations.” This issue is waived because Breslin did not raise it before the 
District Court. Gass, 311 F.3d at 246.
 
6
Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ assessed Breslin’s residual 
functional capacity, which is “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 20 
C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The assessment determines all of a claimant’s limitations 
resulting from medically determinable impairments and self-reported symptoms those 
impairments “could reasonably be expected to produce.” SSR 96-7p; 20 C.F.R. § 
416.945(a). Symptoms are found to cause limitations if those limitations are either 
“substantiated by objective medical evidence” or the ALJ finds the claimant’s statements 
about them credible. SSR 96-7p. A credibility determination must be based on the entire 
 
                                              
5 Even if we were to reach the merits, we would affirm. Breslin’s only support for his 
contention the impairments he names were severe is the medication he was prescribed 
and the doctor’s order he contends he received not to drive. An impairment is severe only 
if it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” 20 
C.F.R. § 416.920(c), as determined only by “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. Breslin provides no medical evidence he 
had any impairments other than chronic heart failure that significantly limited his ability 
to do basic work activities. 
6 Even if we were to reach the merits, we would affirm because Breslin provides no 
factual basis for finding his impairment met or equaled listing 4.05. Cardiac syncope 
(loss of consciousness) or near syncope (altered consciousness) is necessary to meet 
listing 4.05, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 4.00(F)(3), and Breslin does not 
contend he suffered either. 
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case record and “contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the 
evidence in the case record.” Id.  
The ALJ found an assessment of Breslin’s residual functional capacity conducted 
by a state agency consultant was consistent with the medical evidence, and to the extent 
Breslin’s contentions about his limitations were inconsistent with the assessment, those 
contentions were not credible. The assessment found Breslin was “capable of light work, 
except that he can stand/walk only two hours out of an eight hour workday, must avoid 
concentrated exposure to hazards such as heights and machinery, and is limited to 
occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing ramps and 
stairs, and cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.” The ALJ found Breslin’s 
contentions he had other limitations not credible because Breslin’s erratic work history 
“suggest[ed] a lack of motivation to work,” no medical evidence supported Breslin’s 
contentions he had poor circulation and a heart attack, and “[m]ost significantly, he has 
been inconsistent in describing his drinking.” Specifically, in his first consultative 
examination with Dr. Faltas in 2007, Breslin said he drank a pint of alcohol and six pack 
of beer daily, but he testified in the hearing that he had not drunk alcohol since his 2003 
hospitalization.  
Breslin contends the ALJ’s credibility determination was unsupported.7
                                              
7 Breslin says there is no medical evidence he is not credible. This contention 
misunderstands whose role it is to determine credibility: it is the ALJ’s. SSR 96-7p. 
 Breslin 
contends Dr. Faltas’s report does not make clear whether his drinking was still ongoing at 
the time of the examination. The report stated “[t]he patient is a smoker. Admits to 
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drinking 1 pint of alcohol and a six pack of beer every day. Positive cocaine use in 
college. Last use was 20 years ago.” Contrary to Breslin’s assertion, the sentence about 
drinking is clearly in the present tense. Furthermore, in Dr. Faltas’s reexamination of 
Breslin in 2008, Dr. Faltas noted Breslin stated “he has quit smoking and drinking 
alcohol since the last visit,” indicating Breslin had been drinking until at least Dr. Faltas’s 
initial examination in 2007. Breslin contends lay evidence cannot be disregarded for lack 
of medical evidentiary support, citing Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 548 
(3d Cir. 2003). But lay evidence can be found not credible for other reasons, such as 
those the ALJ found. Finally, Breslin questions the validity of the state agency 
consultant’s residual functional capacity assessment. Assuming, as the Commissioner 
does, Breslin means to question the medical evidentiary support for the assessment, 
Breslin’s contention is unavailing. The ALJ found the assessment gave Breslin “the 
benefit of the doubt” of the medical evidence because Dr. Faltas had concluded Breslin’s 
physical condition was “completely unremarkable.” 
At step five, the ALJ considered Breslin’s residual functional capacity, age, 
education, and work experience to determine if he could “make an adjustment to other 
work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). The ALJ found Breslin was between the ages of 45 
and 49 and had at least a high school education. The ALJ found the transferability of 
Breslin’s skills was immaterial to whether Breslin could perform unskilled work. See 
SSR 82-41 (“[E]ven if it is determined that there are no transferable skills, a finding of 
‘not disabled’ may be based on the ability to do unskilled work.”). Because of his 
residual functional capacity to do light work and his age, education, and work experience, 
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Breslin was not disabled under Rule 202.21 (for light work) and Rule 201.21 (for 
sedentary work) of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 
2.8
Breslin contends the ALJ was required to review additional vocational evidence 
beyond Social Security Rulings, such as testimony of a vocational expert, before 
concluding Breslin’s nonexertional limitations did not erode his occupational base. 
Exertional limitations are those that affect the “ability to meet the strength demands of 
jobs . . . for sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling.” 20 C.F.R. 
§404.1569a(a). Nonexertional limitations are any other limitations, including Breslin’s 
postural limitations (his limited ability to stoop, climb, balance, kneel, crouch and crawl) 
and his environmental limitations (his need to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards 
such as machinery and heights). Id.; SSR 96-9p. When a claimant has solely exertional 
limitations, his disability status is determined by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines 
 The ALJ found Breslin’s limitations did not erode his occupational base: under Social 
Security Rulings, sedentary jobs do not require standing or walking more than two hours 
in an eight hour workday, stooping more than occasionally, climbing, balancing, 
kneeling, crouching, crawling, or exposure to hazards such as machinery or heights. SSR 
96-9p; SSR 83-14. The ALJ concluded Breslin was “capable of performing the following 
sedentary, unskilled jobs, according to their descriptions in the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles: surveillance system monitor, call out operator, telephone quotation 
clerk, and scoreboard operator.” (Citations omitted). 
                                              
8 The ability to do light work includes the ability to do sedentary work in the absence of 
additional limiting factors not present here. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). 
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“without reference to additional evidence.” Sykes, 228 F.3d at 269. When a claimant also 
has nonexertional limitations, like Breslin, the ALJ must reference additional evidence 
when determining if those limitations erode the claimant’s occupational base. Id. at 270. 
Such evidence can be a Social Security Ruling as long as it is “crystal-clear that the SSR 
is probative as to the way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to 
work, and thus, the occupational base.” Allen, 417 F.3d at 407. In Allen, we stated the 
ALJ’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence because “we are at a loss to 
find within the Ruling itself the conclusion the ALJ seems to find regarding the 
occupational base.” Id. at 405. In contrast, the Rulings the ALJ cited here explicitly state 
the sedentary occupational base is not eroded by Breslin’s nonexertional impairments. 
See SSR 96-9p (stating in sedentary jobs, “climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, 
balancing, kneeling, crouching, or crawling . . . [is] not usually required,” “[a]n ability to 
stoop occasionally . . . is required,” and exposure to hazards such as machinery and 
heights is “considered unusual”).  
Breslin further contends the ALJ was required to provide advance notice to Breslin 
of his intention to rely on the Rulings instead of more individualized vocational evidence. 
In Allen, we stated that when the ALJ has not provided such advance notice, “[w]e think 
it only appropriate to give close scrutiny to the ALJ’s reliance on a Ruling.” Id. at 408. 
As the Rulings the ALJ relied upon here applied directly to Breslin’s non-exertional 
impairments, the ALJ’s reliance on them passes that scrutiny. 
Finally, Breslin contends the ALJ erred by providing his “opinion” Breslin could 
perform the sedentary, unskilled jobs the ALJ culled from the Dictionary of Occupational 
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Titles. In promulgating the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, “administrative notice has 
been taken of the numbers of unskilled jobs that exist throughout the national economy at 
the various functional levels (sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy) as 
supported by the ‘Dictionary of Occupational Titles’ . . . published by the Department of 
Labor,” among other publications. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 § 200.00(b). By 
naming several unskilled, sedentary jobs listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 
the ALJ was not providing an opinion but simply noting several of the jobs of which the 
Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice. See id. at § 201.00 
(“Approximately 200 separate unskilled sedentary occupations can be identified, each 
representing numerous jobs in the national economy.”). 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and order. 
